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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D.C.

10 April 1950

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MEMORANDUM FOR: IAC Ad Hoc Committee Member, State Department
IAC Ad Hoc Committee Member, Department of the Army
IAC Ad Hoc Committee Member, Department of the Navy
IAC Ad Hoc Committee Member, Central Intelligence ✓
IAC Ad Hoc Committee Member, Federal Bureau of
Investigation

SUBJECT: Air Force Position on U.S. Policy vs. Soviet and Satellite
Attache Personnel on Duty in the United States

1. Pursuant to the stated desire of the Director of Intelligence at the IAC meeting, 31 March 1950, that an IAC Ad Hoc Committee meet for the purpose of considering a U.S. policy with respect to the treatment of Soviet and Satellite personnel on duty in the United States, the following is submitted for consideration by the Committee on 12 April 1950.

2. Although the United States continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and the majority of its satellite states, the United States is engaged in a full-fledged conflict with the Bolshevik High Command. The United States Military Attache in Moscow recently sent two cables which are quoted in part below:

"Realization of what is happening to West (namely all-out war waged according to military combat principles and tactics) we feel should make clear our line which we need follow. Soviets no doubt now realize we recognize this fact."
(MA 52500 dated 3 April 50, CM-IN-16837)

and further:

"We feel war-time methods are now in order." (MA 52501 dated 3 April 50, CM-IN-16838)

3. Heretofore U.S. policy vs. Soviet and Satellite Attache personnel has been determined solely by the agency of primary concern. Whatever existed, in each instance, could just as well be in conflict with another agency's policy, or there was no policy. This lack of policy on the part of the United States as opposed to an increasingly restrictive policy vs. United States personnel, practiced by the Soviets and their satellites has led in the past to several policy statements on the part of high-ranking United States diplomats. Notable in this category are the following:

a. General Walter Bedell Smith, while serving as Ambassador, thought, "that we should be very meticulous in being exactly correct in any and all of our dealings with the Soviets here; that we should do no more and no less than they do for our military representatives in Moscow." (Memo for Record, Foreign Liaison Branch, I.D., GSUSA, 29 September 1948).

b. An Embassy study was prepared on the subject in Moscow. (Secret cable No. 219 from Moscow, signed Kirk, to Secretary of State, 21 January 1950). This study dealt entirely with the subject of reprisal --stronger United States counter-measures--although it suggests a degree of caution, lest they (Embassy Moscow) suffer greater restraint.

4. Although any restrictions placed on Soviet attaché personnel probably will not reduce materially the efficiency of Soviet intelligence in this country, studies made by the Air Force indicate that whether or not the United States will gain more with respect to bettering conditions of United States attaché personnel in the USSR and its satellites, by adopting a firmer policy which approaches a true "quid-pro-quo," it cannot gain less. The low level of effectiveness to which U.S. attached personnel in Moscow and the satellites have already been reduced by Soviet and Satellite policies, appears to be slated for further deterioration, as a result of new and more restrictive policies. A new United States Joint policy should be designed to communicate what we want to communicate to the Kremlin in our own interest.

5. At this point the urgency of the situation and the public and governmental attitude recommends only one policy, that of the strictest limitation on the physical movement and contacts of all Soviet attached personnel, making it clear to them that any violation will be tantamount to justification for asking of their governments their recall. In keeping with our American spirit, we would insist that their observance of these conditions would be a matter of honor, and that any violation, determined by any spot-checking system that our agencies (principally the FBI) can provide, will be cause for their immediate and automatic request for recall.

6. We must face the risk of similar or other reprisal measures being taken against us, but inasmuch as the Kremlin has already done its worst by our military personnel in Moscow, it is hard to see how we would lose by such a policy.


7. In addition, our knowledge of the Soviet character indicates that we stand to gain rather than lose in the bargain herein proposed. If nothing more, we at least stand to gain in self-respect, and that of our Allies and well-wishers (an important commodity in international relations) in which our dealings with the Soviets have brought us to low enough levels heretofore. Public opinion has long since reached a turning point; it is time that this particular policy makes a similar turn and communicates the true state of affairs to the Kremlin.

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8. On March 4, 1950, H.J. Resolution 433 was introduced by the Honorable L. Mendel Rivers in the Second Session of the 81st Congress: "To provide that the U.S. shall withhold from representatives of foreign nations privileges which such nations withhold from representatives of the U.S." A copy of this resolution is attached.

9. In view of the above, the USAF considers it timely to adopt a policy directed toward strict reciprocity, to be implemented in conjunction with the passing of H.J. Resolution 433.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:



1 Incl
H.J. Res. 433

JOHN M. SCHWEIZER, JR.
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Executive
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